hosts and then intrude the victim's system without authentication and always ruin the operating systems in the end. Besides, some unfriendly hackers may capture the data packages on the network and then try to unpack these packages to obtain the information. Hacking brings huge lost both in money and energy. Therefore, many experts and technicians dedicate themselves to avoid these attacks to some extent. It is noticeable that Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) is one of the most advanced cryptographic systems to ensure data transmission security.
Boneh et al. [4] proposed the first PEKS scheme in 2004, which allows users to search encrypted messages by a specific keyword without compromising the security of the primitive data. This scheme is Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA) secure but has its limitations. For instance, it requires a secure channel between the server and the receiver, but building secure channel is much expensive and unrealistic in some cases. Hence, Baek et al. [1] came up with a new method to remove the secure channel from the original PEKS scheme, namely "Secure Channel Free Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (SCF-PEKS)". In reality, the keyword for searching is limited and may suffer Keyword Guessing Attack (KGA). Byun et al. [5] were first found that PEKS was compromising from off-line KGA. Tang et al. [12] introduced a new PEKS scheme resisting off-line KGA, but the encryption algorithm is much complex. Later, Rhee et al. [11] pointed out that KGA may break SCF-PEKS scheme. Therefore, they designed a new SCF-PEKS scheme satisfying the property of Trapdoor Indistinguishability to prevent KGA. In 2013, Zhao et al. [15] proposed an efficient Trapdoor-indistinguishable SCF-PEKS scheme, which has better performance than Rhee et al's scheme. The PEKS mechanisms above tolerate "exact" keyword search instead of supporting spell inconsistent ("common" and "comon") or format error ("PhD" and "Ph.D"), etc. Therefore, Li et al. [10] firstly introduced "Fuzzy Keyword Search" concept into the encrypted model to solve these problems. In 2013, Xu et al. [14] proposed a new PEKS with Fuzzy Keyword Search to resist off-line KGA. Other typical PEKS schemes are also proposed in recent years. Ibraimi et al. [9] proposed PEKS with Delegated Search for detecting encrypted malicious code. Chen et al. [6] formalized Dual-Server PEKS to resist inherent insecurity in 2016. Meanwhile, He et al. [8] proposed a new PEKS scheme which enables users to share contents and subscribe services in mobile social networks. However, these PEKS schemes above specialize in encrypting one keyword only rather than multiple keywords. Baek et al. [1] presented a PEKS scheme to solve multiple keywords search problem but it requires a secure channel to transmit Trapdoor. In 2016, Wang et al. [13] formally defined "Secure Channel Free Public Key Encryption with Multiple Keywords Search (SCF-MPEKS)" to remove the secure channel. However, SCF-MPEKS may suffer KGA, if the malicious server or receiver release its private key to the public. This paper formally defines Trapdoor-indistinguishable Secure Channel Free Public Key Encryption with Multi-Keywords Search (tSCF-MPEKS) model and then presents a construction of tSCF-MPEKS and also proves its security under BDH and 1-BDHI assumptions. The proposed scheme has the properties of Ciphertext Indistinguishability and Trapdoor Indistinguishability which is able to resist KGA and CPA.
METHODOLOGY 2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Let G 1 and G T be two cyclic groups (G 1 denotes an additive group and G T denotes a multiplicative group respectively). д is a generator of G 1 and a large prime number p is the order of G 1 . Let x and y be the elements of Z p . A bilinear pairing can be regarded as a map e : G 1 × G 1 → G T : which has the following properties:
i. Bilinear: e(xM, yN ) = e(M, N ) xy for all M, N ∈ G 1 and x, y ∈ Z p . ii. Computable: e(M, N ) ∈ G T is computable in a polynomial time algorithm, for any M, N ∈ G 1 . iii. Non-degenerate: e(M, N ) 1.
The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
assumption [3] Given P, xP, yP, zP as input (where x, y, z ∈ Z p ), compute e(P, P) xyz ∈ G T . An algorithm A has an advantage ε in solving BDH assumption in G 1 , if Pr [A(P, xP, yP, zP) = e(P, P) xyz ] ≥ ε. It is considered that BDH assumption holds in G 1 if no t time algorithm has an advantage at least ε in solving BDH assumption in G 1 .
2.3 The 1-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (1-BDHI) assumption [2] Given P, xP as input (where x ∈ Z p ), compute e(P, P) 1
x . An algorithm A has an advantage in solving 1-BDHI assumption in G 1 , if Pr [A(P, xP) = e(P, P) 1 x ] ≥ ε . It is considered that 1-BDHI assumption holds in G 1 if no t time algorithm has an advantage at least ε in solving 1-BDHI assumption in G 1 .
TRAPDOOR-INDISTINGUISHABLE SECURE CHANNEL FREE PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION WITH MULTI-KEYWORDS SEARCH 3.1 Generic Model for tSCF-MPEKS
Sender, server and receiver are three participants in tSCF-MPEKS model. More specially, sender is a party creating SCF-MPEKS encryption while receiver is a party creating Trapdoor query. Both the sender and the receiver transmit their encrypted messages to the server. Then, the server runs Test algorithm to check whether two encrypted messages have the same keyword. The details are described as follows: 1. KeyGen P ar am (1 n ): Input 1 n and then produce a common parameter cp. 2. KeyGen Server (cp): Input cp and then produce a public and private key pair (pk Ser , sk Ser ) of the server. 3. KeyGen Receiver (cp): Input cp and then produce a public and private key pair (pk Rec , sk Rec ) of the receiver. 4. SCF − MPEKS(pk Ser , pk Rec ,W ): Input the server's public key pk Ser and the receiver's public key pk Rec , then generate a searchable encryption S of a keyword-vector W = (w 1 , w 2 , ..., w n ). 5. Trapdoor (pk Ser , sk Rec , w): Input the server's public key pk Ser and the receiver's private key sk Rec , then generate a trapdoor T w of a keyword w. 6. T est(sk Ser , S,T w ): Input the server's private key sk Ser , a searchable encryption S=SCF − MPEKS(pk Ser , pk Rec ,W ) and a trapdoor T w =Trapdoor (pk Ser , sk Rec , w). If W includes w, output "yes". Otherwise, output "no". IND-CPA security is that the malicious server could not decide which SCF-MPEKS ciphertext contains which encrypted keyword, if it has not received the Trapdoor containing the given keyword. Besides, if the malicious receiver that has not obtained the server's private key cannot check whether SCF-MPEKS ciphertext and Trapdoor have the same keyword, even if he/she intercepts all Trapdoors for any keyword.
Trapdoor-IND-CPA security is that an outside attacker excluding the server and the receiver cannot differentiate any difference between Trapdoors for two challenge keywords.
The IND-CPA and Trapdoor-IND-CPA for tSCF-MPEKS are formally defined as the following: Let A be an attacker whose running time is bounded by t and E be a challenger.
Game1:
A is supposed to be a malicious server. Setup: The challenger E initially runs KeyGen P ar am (1 n ), KeyGe − n Server (cp) and KeyGen Receiver (cp) to generate a common parameter cp, a public/private key pair (pk Ser , sk Ser ) of the server and a public/private key pair (pk Rec , sk Rec ) of the receiver. Then, the attacker A receives cp, pk Ser , sk Ser and pk Rec . Phase 1-1 (Trapdoor queries): Adaptively, the attacker A can ask E for any trapdoor T w for any keyword w. Challenge: A sends a target keyword-vector pair (W 0 , W 1 ) on which it wishes to be challenged by E, where W 0 = (w 01 , ...., w 0n ) and W 1 = (w 11 , ...., w 1n ). Note that W 0 and W 1 cannot be queried in Phase 1-1. Once E receives the target keyword-vector pair, he/she runs SCF − MPEKS algorithm to generate a searchable encryption S=SCF − MPEKS(pk Ser , pk Rec ,W λ ), where λ ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, E sends S back to A . Phase 1-2 (Trapdoor queries): A can continue to ask E for any trapdoor T w for any keyword w as in Phase 1-1, as long as w w 0 , w 1 . Guess: A outputs the guess λ * ∈ {0, 1} and wins Game1, if λ * = λ.
Game2:
A is supposed to be a malicious receiver. Setup: The challenger E initially runs KeyGen P ar am (1 n ), KeyGe − n Server (cp) and KeyGen Receiver (cp) to generate a common parameter cp, a public/private key pair (pk Ser , sk Ser ) of the server and a public/private key pair (pk Rec , sk Rec ) of the receiver. Then, the attacker A receives cp, pk Rec , sk Rec and pk Ser . Challenge: A sends a target keyword-vector pair (W 0 , W 1 ) on which it wishes to be challenged by E, where W 0 = (w 01 , ...., w 0n ) and W 1 = (w 11 , ...., w 1n ). Notice that T w 0i and T w 1i cannot be queried in T est algorithm, where i = 1, ..., n. Once E receives the target keyword-vector pair, he/she runs SCF −MPEKS algorithm to generate a searchable encryption S=SCF −MPEKS(pk Ser , pk Rec ,W λ ), where λ ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, E sends S back to A. Guess: A outputs the guess λ * ∈ {0, 1} and wins Game2, if λ * = λ.
The advantage of A wins Game1 and Game2 is as follows:
Therefore, the tSCF-MPEKS model can be regarded as IND-CPA secure only if the Adv I N D−C P A
Game3: A is supposed to be an outside attacker excluding the server and the receiver. Setup: The challenger E initially runs KeyGen P ar am (1 n ), KeyGe − n Server (cp) and KeyGen Receiver (cp) to generate a common parameter cp, a public/private key pair (pk Ser , sk Ser ) of the server and a public/private key pair (pk Rec , sk Rec ) of the receiver. Then, the attacker A receives cp, pk Rec , pk Ser while sk Rec , sk Ser cannot be sent to A. Phase 3-1 (Trapdoor queries):Adaptively, the attacker A can ask E for any trapdoor T w for any keyword w. Challenge: A sends a target keyword pair (w 0 , w 1 ) on which it wishes to be challenged by E. It should be clear that none of w 0 and w 1 has been queried in Phase 3-1. Once E receives the target keyword pair, he/she runs T rapdoor algorithm to generate a trapdoor T w =T rapdoor (pk Ser , sk Rec , w λ ), where λ ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, E sends T w back to A. Phase 3-2 (Trapdoor queries): A can continue to ask E for any trapdoor T w for any keyword w as in Phase 3-1, as long as w w 0 , w 1 . Guess: A outputs the guess λ * ∈ {0, 1} and wins Game3, if λ * = λ.
The advantage of A wins Game3 is as follows:
Therefore, the tSCF-MPEKS model can be regarded as Trapdoor-IND-CPA secure only if the Adv 4 PROPOSED tSCF-MPEKS SCHEME 4.1 The Construction of tSCF-MPEKS 1. KeyGen P ar am (k): Suppose G 1 is an additive cyclic group and G T is a multiplicative cyclic group. д is a random generator of G 1 whose order is a prime number p ≥ 2 k . A bilinear pairing is a map e :
be two specific hash functions. This algorithm returns a common
The server randomly chooses a ∈ Z p and then computes A = aP. Besides, the server also chooses B ∈ G 1 uniformly at random. Therefore, the server's public key is pk Ser = (cp, A, B) and the private key is sk Ser = (cp, a). 3. KeyGen Receiver (cp): The receiver randomly chooses c ∈ Z p and then computes C = cP. Therefore, the receiver's public key is pk Rec = (cp, C) and the private key is sk Rec = (cp, c).
The sender randomly chooses t ∈ Z p and then computes a searchable encryption S = (M, N 1 , N 2 
5. Trapdoor (pk Ser , sk Rec , w * ): The receiver randomly chooses t * ∈ Z p and then computesT w = (T 1 ,T 2 ), whereT 1 = cH (w * )⊕e(A, B) t * +c and T 2 = e(A, t * B). 6. T est(S,T w , sk Ser ): For i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, the server initially calculates T = T 1 ⊕ T 2 • e(aB, C) = cH (w * ). Then, the server checks if H * [e(T , M a )] = N i . If so, output "yes"; if not, output "no".
The Correctness of tSCF-MPEKS
Assuming W is a keyword-vector in SCF − MPEKS algorithm and w * is a keyword in Trapdoor algorithm respectively. The scheme is correct if W includes w * . The details are described below: For i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n},
Then,
= N i Game1: A is supposed to be a malicious server.
The Security Analysis of tSCF-MPEKS
Proof. Suppose that E has (д, p, G 1 , G T , e, xP, yP, zP) as an input of BDH assumption whose running time is bounded by T . E's aim is to calculate a BDH key e(P, P) xyz of xP, yP and zP using A's IND-CPA. Besides, suppose that A asks for at most h and h * hash function queries.
Setup Simulation E firstly sets C = xP and randomly selects a ∈ Z p and then calculates A = aP. E also picks up B ∈ G 1 uniformly at random.
Finally, E returns (д, p, G 1 , G T , e, H, H * ) as the common parameter cp, (cp,A,B) and (cp,a) as the server's public/private keys and (cp,C)
as the receiver's public key. Besides, E chooses two hash functions H and H * as follows:
-A can query a keyword w i to H function at any time. To respond, E searches H _List for a tuple (w i , F i , f i , θ i ) and the H _List is empty in original. If the sample exists, A will receive H (w i ) = F i as a response. Otherwise, E does the following steps: i. E picks up a coin θ i uniformly at random and then calculates
iii. E returns F i as a response to A and adds (w i , F i , f i , θ i ) into H _List.
-A can query D i to H * function at any time. Then, E searches H * _List for a tuple (D i , N i ) . If the sample exists, A will receive N i as a response. Otherwise, E selects N i ∈ {0, 1} d uniformly at random and then returns it to A and also adds (D i , N i ) into H * _List. Phase 1-1 Simulation (Trapdoor queries) When A issues a query for the trapdoor corresponding to the word w i . To respond, E executes the following steps: -E runs the above algorithm for simulating H function to create a tuple (w i , F i , f i , θ i ). If θ i = 0, E will stop and output "Suspension". Otherwise, E conducts the next step. -E selects t * ∈ Z p and then computes T 1 = f i C ⊕ e(A, B) t * +x = f i xP ⊕ e(A, B) t * +x = xF i ⊕ e(A, B) t * +x = xH (w i ) ⊕ e(A, B) t * +x and T 2 = e(A, t * B). So, T w =(T 1 ,T 2 ). Challenge Simulation A sends W 0 =(w 01 ,w 02 ,...,w 0n ) and W 1 =(w 11 ,w 12 ,...,w 1n ) to E. Upon receiving the target keyword-vector pair, E responds as follows: -E randomly selects i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
-E runs the above algorithms for simulating H function to obtain two tuples (w * 0i , F * 0i , f * 0i , θ * 0i ) and (w * 1i , F * 1i , f * 1i , θ * 1i ). If θ * 0i and θ * 1i are equal to 1, E will stop and output "Suspension". Otherwise, E conducts the next step. i. E runs the above algorithms for simulating H function at 2(n − 1) times to obtain two vectors of tuples ((w * 01 , F * 01 , f * 01 , θ * 01 ), ..., (w * 0i−1 ,
. If θ * 0j and θ * 1j are equal to 0 for all j = 0, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ..., n, E will stop and output "Suspension". Otherwise, E responds as follows: -E randomly chooses β ∈ {0, 1} d .
-E randomly chooses J j ∈ {0, 1} d and creates a target SCF −MPEKS
Note that J j = e(H (w β i ), C) z = e(yP + f β i P, xP) z = e(yP, xP) z • e(f β i P, xP) z = e(P, P) xyz • e(zP, xP) f β i Note also that e(f β k P, xP) z = e(f β k P, C) z = e(H (w β k ), C) z Phase 1-2 Simulation (Trapdoor queries) A can continue to ask E for Trapdoor queries for the keyword w i . E answers A as in Phase 1-1, as long as w i W 0 ,W 1 . Guess A outputs the guess β * ∈ {0, 1}. Then, E selects d in the list for H * function and returns
as the guess for BDH key.
Analysis of Game1
Three events are customized as follows:
Event1: E does not suspend during Phase 1-1 and Phase 1-2 (Trapdoor queries).
Event2: E does not suspend during Challenge Simulation. Event3: A does not issue a query for either one of H * (e(H (w * 0i ), C) z ) or H * (e(H (w * 1i ), C) z ).
Proof. Suppose that A does not issue the same keyword twice in Trapdoor queries. So, the probability that a Trapdoor query causes E for suspension is 1 h+1 . Therefore, due to A asks for at most h Trapdoor queries, the probability that E does not suspend in all is at least
Claim 2:
Proof. If θ 0 = θ 1 = 1, E will suspend during Challenge Simulation. So, the probability that E does not suspend is 1 − (1 − 1 h+1 ) 2 . Besides, if θ * 0j and θ * 1j are equal to 0 for all j = 0, ..., i −1, i +1, ..., n, E will also suspend here. Hence, the probability that E does not suspend during Challenge Simulation is at least
Proof. As discussed in [1] , suppose Hybrid r for r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} is an event that the attacker A can successfully guess the keyword of the left part of a "hybrid" SCF − MPEKS Ciphertext formed with r , coordinates from w β followed by (n − r ) coordinates from w 1−β .
Because the probability that A issues a query for either H * (e(H (w * 0i ), C) z ) or H * (e(H (w * 1i ), C) z ) is at least 2ε, the probability that A issues a query for H * (e(H (w * ji ), C) z ) is at least ε. In total, E's success probability ε * is ( h h+1 ) 2(n−1) • ε e(h+1)h * .
Theorem 4.2. The tSCF-MPEKS scheme above is IND-CPA secure against CPA in Game2 under the random oracle model assuming that 1-BDHI assumption is intractable.
Game2: A is supposed to be a malicious receiver.
Proof. Suppose that E has (д, p, G 1 , G T , e, xP) as an input of 1-BDHI assumption whose running time is bounded by T . E's aim is to calculate a 1-BDHI key e(P, P) 1 x of xP using A's IND-CPA. Besides, suppose that A asks for at most h and h * hash function queries.
Setup Simulation E firstly sets A = xP and B ∈ G 1 . E also selects c ∈ Z p uniformly at random and calculates C = cP. Then, E returns (д, p, G 1 , G T , e, H, H  *  ) as the common parameter cp, (cp,A,B) as the server's public key, (cp,C) and (cp,c) as the receiver's public/private keys. Besides, E chooses two hash functions H and H * as follows: -A can query a keyword w i to H function at any time. To respond, E selects f i ∈ Z p uniformly at random and then calculates F i = f i P and finally returns F i as a response to A. -A can query D i to H * function at any time. Then, E searches H * _List for a tuple (D i , N i ). If the sample exists, A will receive N i as an answer. Otherwise, E selects N i ∈ {0, 1} d uniformly at random and then returns it to A and also adds
Note that e(H (w β * i ), C) ψ ) = e(f i P, cP) ψ = e(P, P) ψ ·f i c . Guess A outputs the guess β * ∈ {0, 1}. Then, E selects d in the list for H * function and returns ψ = 1 x ·f i c as the guess for 1-BDHI key.
Analysis of Game2
Two events are customized as follows: Event4: E does not suspend during Challenge Simulation. Event5: A does not issue a query for either one of H * (e(H (w * 0i ), C) ψ ) or H * (e(H (w * 1i ), C) ψ ).
Proof. There is no restriction to show that E will suspend during Challenge Simulation. Therefore, it is easy to know that Pr [Event4] = 1.
Proof. When Event5 happens, it is known that the bit j ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether the Ciphertext contains w 0i or w 1i is independent of A's view. Thus, the probability that A's output j * satisfying j = j * is at most 1 2 . According to Bayes's rule,
According to the definition, it is clear that |Pr
Because the probability that A issues a query for either H * (e(H (w * 0i ), C) ψ ) or H * (e(H (w * 1i ), C) ψ ) is at least 2ε, the probability that A issues a query for H * (e(H (w * ji ), C) ψ ) is at least ε. Due to A asks for at most h * hash function queries, the probability that E selects the correct answer is at least 1 h * . In total, E's success probability ε * is ε h * .
Theorem 4.3. The tSCF-MPEKS scheme above is Trapdoor-IND-CPA secure against CPA in Game3 under the random oracle model assuming that BDH assumption is intractable.
Game3: A is supposed to be an outside attacker excluding the server and the receiver.
Setup Simulation E firstly sets A = xP, B = yP and C = zP and then returns (cp, A, B) as the server's public key and (cp, C) as the receiver's public key. E also randomly chooses two H and H * hash functions at random. Phase 3-1 Simulation (Trapdoor queries) When A issues a query for the trapdoor corresponding to the word w i . To respond, E chooses t * ∈ Z p uniformly at random and then computes T 1 = zH (w i ) ⊕ e(yP, xP) t * +z and T 2 = e(t * yP, xP). So, T w =(T 1 ,T 2 ). Finally, E returns T w to A. Challenge Simulation A sends (w * 0 , w * 1 ) to E. E creates the challenge Trapdoor as follows: E randomly selects a bit β ∈ {0, 1} d . Therefore, T 1 = zH (w β * ) ⊕ e(yP, xP) t * +z = zH (w β * )⊕e(P, P) xyz •e(P, P) xyt * andT 2 = e(t * yP, xP). Phase 3-2 Simulation (Trapdoor queries) A can continue to ask E for Trapdoor queries for the keyword w i . E answers A as in Phase 3-1, as long as w i w 0 , w 1 . Guess A outputs the guess β * ∈ {0, 1}. If β = β * , E outputs "yes". Otherwise, E outputs "no".
Analysis of Game3
Due to A is a malicious outside attacker, he/she cannot distinguish any difference between two Trapdoors even though these two Trapdoors have the same keyword. The reason is that E randomly chooses t * ∈ Z p and t * changes every time leading to T 1 = cH (w i ) ⊕ e(A, B) t * +c changes every time. Even if two Trapdoors have the same keyword, the results are still different because of t * . Therefore, the key part of Trapdoor Indistinguishability in tSCF-MPEKS is the confidentiality of e(A, B) t * +c .
Suppose that the attacker A obtains the value of e(A, B) t * +c , he/she can distinguish whether two Trapdoors have the same keyword.
The reason is that the attacker A only calculates one extra XOR operation as T 1 = cH (w i ) ⊕ e(A, B) t * +c ⊕ e(A, B) t * +c = cH (w i ). Therefore, the attack A can distinguish that T w 0 = cH (w 0 ) and T w 1 = cH (w 1 ) are equal as long as w 0 = w 1 . According to Challenge Simulation in Game3, it is known that e(A, B) t * +c = e(P, P) xyz • e(P, P) xyt * , which satisfies BDH assumption. Consequently, the attacker A cannot calculate the value of e(A, B) t * +c and therefore, he/she cannot compute T 1 = cH (w i ) ⊕ e(A, B) t * +c .
COMPARISON AND PERFORMANCE
This section presents a comparison of security between the proposed scheme (tSCF-MPEKS) and another two typical schemes (MPEKS [1] and SCF-MPEKS [13] ). In addition, the performance of the proposed scheme is also described in this part. The proposed scheme is simulated using type A pairing in JPBC Library [7] . The conditions of the simulation platform is illustrated in Table 2 and the time cost is shown in Table 3 . However, the proposed scheme removes the secure channel so that the trapdoor can be transmitted via the public networks. Also, the proposed scheme satisfies Ciphertext Indistinguishability and Trapdoor Indistinguishability which is able to resist KGA. Overall, the proposed scheme has better performance than Baek et al's MPEKS [1] and Wang et al's SCF-MPEKS [13] schemes. 
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Programming language JAVA and also presents a concrete scheme. The proposed scheme solves multiple keywords search problem and incorporates the advantages of removing secure channel so that it is a practical and costsaving system. By comparison of security between the tSCF-MPEKS scheme and the others, the proposed scheme satisfying Trapdoor Indistinguishability is much secure and can prevent KGA. In addition, the proposed scheme is efficient and has high performance by 1000 times computer simulation.
